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DILEMMAS OF REPRESENTATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
SEMI-CITIZENSHIP 
ELIZABETH F. COHEN* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article takes up the question of “who counts?” with a three-part 
argument. The first part of the argument makes the case that citizenship in 
liberal democracies is subject to stresses caused by internal doctrinal conflict 
that result in the creation of semi-citizenship statuses that offer some 
individuals partial bundles of rights and semi-citizen statuses. Semi-citizenship 
is inevitable. The second part of the argument looks closely at how this affects 
the distribution of the political rights of citizenship: voting and representation. 
I make the argument that we ought not conflate voting and representation. 
Each is a distinct political right. People who cannot vote or do not vote are not 
necessarily entirely unrepresented. This is particularly evident if one takes 
seriously the trustee model of representation. The third part of the Article 
compares three different cases of semi-citizenship in which groups who are 
counted for the purposes of the census and legislative apportionment are not 
accorded the vote. I examine the cases of children, non-citizens, and felons, 
briefly illustrating how and why trusteeship serves the first two groups and 
fails the third. These conclusions bolster the case for treating trusteeship as a 
necessary component of a liberal democratic state and for treating it skeptically 
in circumstances in which the trusteeship is not clearly linked to the political 
capabilities of the population in question. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To count and be counted is a fundamental task of liberal democratic states 
and their citizenries. Counting is shorthand for multifaceted dilemmas of 
representation. These dilemmas include the challenges of how states document 
and represent their populations, how individuals represent their own identities 
to the public, and how citizens’ interests are represented in the process of 
democratic decision-making. When we ask who counts in a liberal democratic 
state, we are really asking who should be represented, how they should be 
represented, and are they represented in that way. Asking who does or does not 
count therefore raises overarching questions about the relationship of 
representation to the bona fides of any democracy. In this Article I respond to 
the challenge of asking who counts by examining the relationship between 
citizenship theory and representation. I make a two-pronged argument in which 
I first assert that all rights of citizenship, including representation, are accorded 
to people in differentiated bundles rather than being distributed to each 
member of the population in identical fashion. These bundles of differentiated 
rights in turn create semi-citizenships—political statuses that depart from full 
citizenship in any nation-state. We would, therefore, expect that every liberal 
democratic state will produce a set of possible routes for representation rather 
than one single unitary means for representing citizens’ interests. Members of 
the population of any given nation-state will be represented using some or all 
parts of an arsenal of representation techniques. The second prong of the 
argument compares delegate and trustee style representation and pushes back 
against the assumption that representation is a unitary process whose only 
legitimate form is trusteeship. 
I.  SEMI-CITIZENSHIP 
We ask whether someone counts in politics because representation is 
among the fundamental rights that, as a complete bundle, compose liberal 
democratic citizenship. Calling the representativeness of a polity into question 
is tantamount to calling it undemocratic. But because both citizenship and 
representation come in many shapes and sizes, we need to be able to define 
each and understand their relationship to each other. As I have described 
elsewhere,1 democratic citizenship is a political status that is gradient rather 
than binary. This means that rather than dividing a population into citizens and 
non-citizens, we accept the fact that citizenship exists on a continuum. People 
do not hold one uniform public status. Rather, semi-citizenships abound, 
offering slightly differentiated bundles of rights to various subsets of the 
population. Full citizenship is defined as the possession of all fundamental 
social, civil, and political rights along with legal nationality (the right to reside 
 
 1. ELIZABETH F. COHEN, SEMI-CITIZENSHIP IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICS (2009). 
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and move freely in a country). But many people carry different versions of a 
basic rights bundle. People may possess some but not all of those fundamental 
rights. They may be missing an entire category of rights (for example, stateless 
persons have no legal nationality2) or they may have a weak version of one or 
more categories of rights (for example, newly arrived legal immigrants and 
temporary guests in the United States have only some social welfare rights 
associated with full citizenship3). Like any democratic right, representation can 
be parceled out in different degrees and forms. Any discussion of “who 
counts” will necessitate an inquiry into what it means to be represented, what 
are the range of acceptable forms and degrees of representation, whether 
everyone who ought to be represented is actually represented, and whether 
these differentiations of representation are justifiable. 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF SEMI-CITIZENSHIP 
To fully respond to these questions we must first understand the root 
explanation for the slicing up of citizenship’s component rights into semi-
citizenships. In the United States and its peer nations, a liberal democratic state 
is responsible for defining and ensuring citizenship. The liberal democratic 
state marries three distinct logics or doctrines of membership: that of the state 
(administrative rationality and governmentality), that of liberalism (neutral 
egalitarian inclusiveness), and that of the demos (situated ethics). These logics 
of membership overlap at some points and conflict at others. It is the points of 
conflict and attempts to forge compromises in the context of doctrinal conflict 
that produce semi-citizenships, including, but not limited to, semi-citizenships 
in which some semi-citizens are not represented on the same terms as other 
semi-citizens and full citizens. Below I briefly introduce the three doctrines of 
membership. 
States are subject to the demands of an administrative rationality that will 
constrain and contort the identities that individuals might choose in the absence 
of things like census boxes and human resources affirmative action 
questionnaires. In his Childress Lecture essay, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 
Professor Levinson cites the work of James Scott and Melissa Nobles as 
supporting the idea that the state is highly invested in counting and 
categorizing its population.4 At root, their insights represent Foucauldian views 
of the state. Foucault treats the state as an extension of what he terms 
 
 2. Id. at 146–47. 
 3. Jennifer B. Kinney & Elizabeth F. Cohen, Multilevel Citizenship in a Federal State: The 
Case of Noncitizens’ Rights in the United States, in MULTILEVEL CITIZENSHIP 70, 72–76 (Willem 
Maas ed., 2013). 
 4. Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937, 978–979 
(2014). 
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“governmental” logic. He defines governmentality, using three related criteria, 
as: 
1. The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very 
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its 
principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical 
means apparatuses of security. 
2.  . . . [T]he pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) 
of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting on the one 
hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, 
and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of savoirs. 
3. The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of 
justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes “governmentalized.”5 
Governmentality brings scientific rationality to politics, creating a political 
rationality whose stated end is to secure and improve the circumstances of the 
population being governed. True to Foucauldian form, governmentality 
addresses itself to questions of how politics can be conducted to ensure public 
health, security, and stable power arrangements, among many things. As such, 
governmentality and states that realize governmental logic will administer 
citizenship rights with an eye to the security of the population rather than any 
particular normative philosophy, including, but not limited to, liberal or 
democratic theory. 
All liberal democracies find their attempts to count and rationally 
categorize populations tempered by the strong commitment of their citizens to 
specific forms of government and ideologies, namely liberalism and 
democratic theory. In the case of the United States, this means that 
administrative rationality, liberal norms, and democratic norms are all 
competing with one another over the terrain of citizenship rights. Liberalism 
and democratic theory each stand in contrast to governmentality insofar as they 
are normative doctrines. Liberalism prioritizes egalitarian inclusiveness.6 It is 
predicated on the intrinsic equality of all persons. Liberalism confers rights on 
 
 5. Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 102–103 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991). Foucault’s most extensive 
elaboration of the ideas of population and governmentality is contained in lectures he gave at the 
Collège de France. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE 
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1977–1978 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007) (2004) [hereinafter LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE]. See especially 
Lecture of Jan. 11, 1978, in LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, supra, at 1; Lecture of Jan. 
18, 1978, in LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, supra, at 29; Lecture of Jan. 25, 1978, in 
LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, supra, at 55. 
 6. Jeremy Waldron, Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL 
THEORY 89, 89 (Gerald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 2004). 
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all autonomous individuals. Several influential contemporary critiques of the 
liberal state also assert that liberalism privileges the unitary insofar as it 
prioritizes equality, and hence they oppose ostensibly unitary political status 
with more diverse social identities.7 Charles Taylor emphasizes the way in 
which liberalism leaves people homogenous.8 Iris Young’s theory of 
differentiated citizenship makes a related, but potentially more systemizing, 
effort to suggest that liberal impartiality operates on three dimensions.9 It 
“denies the particularity of situations”; “master[s] or eliminate[s] 
heterogeneity”; and “reduc[es] the plurality of moral subjects to one 
subjectivity.”10 Young argues that the liberal state papers over inequalities 
generated via the oppression of identity groups. It does this by falsely asserting 
that the act of abstracting diverse individuals into citizens transforms their 
diversity into an identical public entity: the citizen. “[T]he ideal of impartiality 
in moral theory expresses a logic of identity that seeks to reduce differences to 
unity. The stances of detachment and dispassion that supposedly produce 
impartiality are attained only by abstracting from the particularities of 
situation, feeling, affiliation, and point of view.”11 Liberalism on its own does 
not seem to provide a basis for boundaries or distinguishing among differently 
entitled subjects. 
In contrast, democratic norms are reliant on situated principles.12 By its 
very nature, a demos must discriminate. It must develop a rule stating who is 
and is not included in the demos and then turn over enforcement of that rule to 
the state. Democratic rules about who receives the rights of citizenship will 
refer to the situated ethics produced by the people, traditions, and belief 
systems that compose a society.13 This stands in stark contrast to liberalism’s 
inclusive egalitarianism and administrative rationality’s focus on security and 
efficiency. Robert Dahl describes the opposition between liberal egalitarian 
citizenship norms and democratic inclinations to draw situated boundaries 
using the categorical and contingent principles.14 The categorical principle 
states: “Every person subject to a government and its laws has an unqualified 
right to be a member of the demos (i.e., a citizen).”15 Robert Goodin has 
promoted a similar principle under the name of including “all affected 
 
 7. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 97 (1990). 
 8. Charles Taylor, Hegel: History, and Politics, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS, 177, 193 
(Michael J. Sandel ed., New York Univ. Press 1984) (1975). 
 9. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 100–01. 
 10. Id. at 100. 
 11. Id. at 97. 
 12. COHEN, supra note 1, at 100–02. 
 13. Id. 
 14. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 120, 122 (1989). 
 15. Id. at 124. 
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interests.”16 The contingent principle states that “[o]nly persons who are 
qualified to govern, but all such persons, should be members of the demos (i.e., 
citizens).”17 To resolve this conflict of values, Dahl tests the validity of a 
“modified categorical principle” that states that “[e]very adult subject to a 
government and its law must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an 
unqualified right to be, a member of the demos.”18 Dahl resolves that inclusion 
must be based upon the following criterion: “The demos must include all adult 
members of the association except transients and persons proved to be 
mentally defective.”19 He therefore flags maturity, capability, and a temporal 
relationship to the space associated with a given demos as the most significant 
indicators of citizenship. 
Dahl’s theory seems to raise more questions than it answers and offers a 
reminder of the problems inherent in defining the boundaries of a gradient 
category such as citizenship. Indeed, the modified categorical principle of 
membership invites disputes related to boundary and threshold. How do we 
define fitness for citizenship? What is the line between adulthood and 
childhood? When does someone make the transition from being a foreigner to 
being a subject of the laws, and therefore to being a citizen? The contingent 
principle and its particularity carries with it the potential for myriad forms of 
partiality, both intended and unintended. Even its use to modify a categorical 
norm will impose some situated ethics on an otherwise liberal framework for 
citizenship. In so doing, the rights of citizenship will be subdivided, creating 
semi-citizenships. 
Doctrinal competition is the reason that in any liberal democratic state 
there will not be one single version of a perfectly whole citizenship. Instead, 
there are many different semi-citizenships. The idea that there would be one 
single citizenship starts to seem very unlikely when one considers that not only 
are we trying to fit a whole bunch of very differently situated people into that 
mold, but the ideologies that go into defining the citizenship are in constant 
negotiations over who will have privacy and when, what “counts” as free 
speech, and when is the exact moment that a child or a foreign-born person 
becomes a citizen. All of the fundamental rights of citizenship can be sliced 
into constituent parts to create semi-citizenships. 
The three-way doctrinal competition between administrative rationality, 
liberalism, and democratic situated ethics is of great consequence for how 
political rights, and particularly representation, will be defined and accorded in 
any liberal democratic state. Administrative rationality will emphasize 
 
 16. Robert E. Goodin, Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives, 35 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 40, 48–51 (2007). 
 17. DAHL, supra note 14, at 124. 
 18. Id. at 127. 
 19. Id. at 129. 
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efficiency—in this view, representation only matters insofar as it relates to 
national security threats, contagion, or economic functioning. Liberalism seeks 
to be fair, egalitarian, and inclusive. Of the three doctrines, liberalism has the 
least interest in a complex system of representation. In fact, for the purposes of 
liberalism, it would be best if we were not invested in complex pictures of 
ourselves that call on various forms of difference. Better if we are all equally 
situated rational choosers interested in maximizing our liberty and self-
interest.20 Religion, race, gender, and so on just muddy things, particularly 
when they intersect with each other.21 Inclusiveness is easiest when we can 
make a rule that all people are equal and equally entitled. Finally, democracy 
seeks us to follow our hearts and minds. Democracies need to know a lot about 
our identities. And because the demos is going to make decisions about the 
worth and standing of various facets of identity, it is also going to pose 
challenges to liberalism and the state, both of which I have described as fairly 
uninterested in the nuances of identity. As it turns out, our hearts and minds are 
neither efficient, like states, nor fair and inclusive like liberalism. Quite the 
contrary, as Professor Levinson shows us.22 Demoi exhibit myriad prejudices 
and forms of partiality. In turn, such prejudices and partiality create 
representation rules that directly contradict the mandates of administrative 
rationality and liberalism. 
III.  REPRESENTATION 
Semi-citizenships are the product of doctrinal conflict in liberal democratic 
states, and they take the form of memberships that offer people some but not 
all of the rights of citizenship. The rights of citizenship are generally 
recognized as falling into one of four categories. T.H. Marshall’s widely cited 
definition of citizenship includes social rights, civil rights, and political 
rights.23 To this I would add rights to place and free movement.24 These rights 
are the essential elements of the democratic bundle that defines citizenship.25 
Representation is classified as a political right.26 “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?” 
takes up the question of semi-citizenship as it pertains to the many facets of 
political rights and representation. The examples Professor Levinson 
introduces show the hallmark traits of doctrinal conflict and compromise. At 
 
 20. A Kantian or Rawlsian system of representation would comport with this 
characterization of liberalism. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60 (1971). 
 21. DARA Z. STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN 
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 46–48 (2007). 
 22. Levinson, supra note 4, at 945–46, 970–71. 
 23. T.H. MARSHALL, Citizenship and Social Class, in CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT 78 (1964). 
 24. COHEN, supra note 1, at 17, 145. 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. See MARSHALL, supra note 23; DAHL, supra note 14, at 28–30. 
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the heart of Levinson’s essay is dismay about the fact that there are large 
numbers of persons in the United States who are counted in the census and 
included in apportionment figures that determine the number of Congressional 
seats a state will have but who cannot vote.27 Let me restate this quandary in 
the terms of doctrinal conflict. The state, acting on governmental logic, is 
compelled to count every last person it can identify within its borders. This 
means that the census includes undocumented persons, resident aliens, and 
imprisoned felons, in addition to the modal full citizen population. By contrast, 
the demos has made rules for enfranchising people that generally exclude 
people without legal nationality and people who are incarcerated, among 
others.28 This is not a problem for the purposes of administrative rationality, 
but it does violate liberal egalitarian norms that cannot justify exclusionary 
representation practices. Egalitarianism and ethical democracy dictate different 
answers about whether all persons subject to the law of the land ought to have 
a say in the making of those laws. This is a clear example of Dahl’s categorical 
and contingent principles at play. 
Districting rules, another example raised in “Who Counts?” “Sez 
Who?”,29 are caught in a three-way tug of war between efficiency, fairness, 
and a historically exclusionary demos. Bureaucratically rational districts that 
maximize the efficient administration of territorial subunits are frequently 
altered by gerrymandering.30 Gerrymandering, in turn, is imposed at times to 
improve the chances that minorities will receive adequate representation and at 
other times to accomplish the exact opposite.31 In the former case 
gerrymandering is being used to improve the chances that representation will 
be accomplished in an egalitarian fashion. In the latter instance 
gerrymandering is being used to express the will of an inegalitarian demos. A 
third example of doctrinal conflict that results in a dilemma for representation 
rights crystallizes around voter identification. Identity papers begin as a means 
 
 27. Levinson, supra note 4, at 947–57. 
 28. On the franchise rights of non-citizens, see RON HAYDUK, DEMOCRACY FOR ALL: 
RESTORING IMMIGRANT VOTING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006); Jamin B. Raskin, 
Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien 
Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1392–93 (1993). Most felons and many ex-felons are also 
presently disenfranchised. On felon disenfranchisement, see JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER 
UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–8 (2006); 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States, 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_48642.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 2, 2014). 
 29. Levison, supra note 4, at 954–55. 
 30. On the idea of a rational district and frequent gerrymandering of U.S. electoral districts, 
see Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Reapportionment Gerrymanders and the Notion of “Compactness”, 
50 MINN. L. REV. 443, 443–44 (1966). On the reasons for gerrymandering, see Samuel 
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 595, 598 (2002). 
 31. Issacharoff, supra note 30, at 597, 602–03. 
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for the state to document and monitor its population.32 For the purposes of 
liberalism, however, they come to stand in for a uniform public status. A 
passport or a Social Security card is evidence of one’s political standing in the 
eyes of the state. Yet at times the selective privileging of forms of 
identification to which subsets of the population have limited access has also 
been a means through which various forms of discrimination could be 
imposed. It is no wonder that in 2013 we find ourselves in an intense national 
wrangle about whether student IDs or gun licenses are valid ways of letting the 
government discern who among us is an eligible voter.33 And it is equally 
unsurprising that our voter identification compromises have created groups of 
semi-citizens whose opportunity to vote is now in doubt. 
These and other quandaries about who is represented in politics are 
essentially questions about who is accorded which kind of semi-citizenship and 
for what reasons. Any measure of how fully someone is accorded citizenship 
must take into account the degree to which that person is represented in 
politics. To assess the degree to which someone is represented is to assess the 
degree to which their views and interests “count” in the terms of democratic 
politics. This assessment requires an understanding of what constitutes 
representation. Representation itself is an essentially contested concept.34 As 
Hanna Pitkin’s seminal text on representation states, it “presupposes at least a 
rudimentary conception of what representation (or power, or interest) is, what 
counts as representation, where it leaves off and some other phenomenon 
begins.”35 Pitkin details the modern nature of representation in contrast to 
ancient ideas that more literally took representation to mean the re-presentation 
of something absent, such as an abstract object like a book or a face depicted in 
a work of art.36 Representation only came to be applied to people, and in the 
context of politics, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.37 
Once representation was incorporated into early and high modern political 
theory, its meanings proliferated. From Hobbes’ capacious understanding of 
almost any government as being representative,38 to Rousseau’s narrow view 
 
 32. CRAIG ROBERTSON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT 4–7 
(2010); JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP AND 
THE STATE 14–15 (2000). 
 33. Veronica Harwin, A Tale of Two States: Challenges to Voter ID Ballot Measures in 
Missouri and Minnesota, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 205–11 (2013). 
 34. W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN 
SOCIETY 167, 169 (1955–56). 
 35. HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 1–2 (1967). 
 36. Id. at 2–3. 
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Id. at 30. 
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that representation could only be enacted directly,39 norms defining what it 
means to “count” in politics abound. Each political system will generate its 
own version of representation. In contrast to something like a right to free 
movement, representation can only be fully understood in context. In Charles 
Tilly’s terms, we call representation a relative right.40 Relative rights are 
defined contextually, relative to the political system that generates them. That 
means that we can only understand representation in the context of the society 
and ethical system in which politics is being conducted. What constitutes 
representation will vary from one political system to another. For example, 
proportional representation is predicated on the idea that representation of a 
demos with a diverse set of political views requires a similarly diverse set of 
representatives.41 By contrast, a winner-take-all system generally produces a 
relatively small number of political parties with a less diverse set of platforms 
and candidates.42 What it means to “count”—to be represented on par with 
one’s fellow citizens—will depend on very different outcomes in proportional 
and winner-take-all systems. 
The relative nature of representation is critical because it will confine any 
normative claims we wish to make about whether people are or are not 
properly represented in any given political system. Representation is best 
judged from within the political system because it is nearly impossible to 
specify a single ideal formula for representation. We are better off not making 
the claim that someone’s citizenship in the United States is degraded simply 
because they are not represented in the terms that a German citizen would be.43 
We might ask instead whether that U.S. citizen is represented in the manner 
promised by the U.S. political system. Is that person represented on the same 
terms as all other U.S. citizens? 
The answer, according to Levinson, is that many people in the United 
States are not fully and equally represented in the manner promised by the U.S. 
 
 39. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 102 (Rogers D. Masters ed., 
Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762). 
 40. Relative rights are distinguished from autonomous rights. Autonomous rights do not 
depend on context for interpretation. So, for example, the autonomous right to free exercise will 
not mean something different in different regimes. CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY 25–
26 (1998). 
 41. André Blais, Agnieszka Dobrzynska & Indridi H. Indridason, To Adopt or Not to Adopt 
Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 182, 183 
(2005). 
 42. Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed 
Systems, 18 INT’L. POL. SCI. REV. 297, 301 (1997). 
 43. An exception is the interrogation of representation lodged by Robert Dahl in ROBERT A. 
DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2d ed. 2003), and a separate 
discussion of our legislative process in SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2006). I will take up these concerns later in this Article. See infra notes 61–70. 
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political system and on the same terms as their fellow citizens.44 He points to a 
powerful set of examples illustrating precipitous disparities of representation 
within the U.S. population.45 As noted earlier,46 undocumented immigrants, 
unnaturalized persons, felons, and an array of other groups of persons cannot 
vote even though all of them are counted for the purposes of the census and 
congressional apportionment. Each of these groups is also taxed and subject to 
the law of the land and each is eligible for some, if meager, social and civil 
rights.47 These groups are semi-citizens who cannot vote and whom Levinson 
therefore claims are also denied the political right to representation.48 
“Who Counts?” “Sez Who?” rightly expresses that public officials view 
the job of representation to be responding to, and even mirroring, the stated 
preferences of their constituents.49 This is an accurate reflection of what many 
elected officials report and what many, if not most, of their constituents also 
report.50 But democratic theorists have produced a very rich and important 
second tradition of representation. This second tradition regards elected 
officials as the guardians of the best interests of the public.51 Edmund Burke 
makes the distinction into one between preferences and interests.52 Delegates 
are bound to represent the preferences of voters.53 Trustees are bound to 
represent the interests of the voters.54 When voters’ stated preferences diverge 
from an assessment of their interests, the delegate cannot justifiably act on 
knowledge of those interests and a trustee should not be swayed by any 
statement of preferences.55 For Burke, representatives are obligated to be the 
ultimate source of judgment about the best interests of a demos.56 
There are various names for the two traditions. In deference to the common 
parlance of political theory, I will call them the delegate and the trustee models 
of representation. The essay “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?” speaks primarily of 
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the delegate model of representation and tacitly defends this model of 
representation. It is important, however, not to dismiss trusteeship. Trusteeship 
shares important normative premises with other pillars of the U.S. political 
system. It is also empirically virtually impossible not to incorporate elements 
of trusteeship into a legal rational government. Nadia Urbinati astutely notes 
that Rousseau’s body of work, taken as a whole, does not reject representation 
(as so many people assume after reading The Social Contract) so much as he 
sees delegation as a form of trusteeship that is distinct from the act of 
representing one’s own views in a deliberation and decision-making process.57 
Decision-making should be done by citizens, but other kinds of legislation 
might be better effected by representatives. We must not convince ourselves, 
however, that delegation is somehow a more authentic form of representation 
than trusteeship. Delegates are interpreters of interests just as are trustees. 
IV.  THE PLACE OF TRUSTEESHIP IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
The normative defenses of trusteeship are not only plausible, they are 
integral to the theories of representation that shaped the American political 
system. Controversial norms aside, trusteeship is inextricably woven into the 
fabric of U.S. politics. Elsewhere, Levinson points out that the Philadelphia 
Convention saw open advocacy of including an element of trusteeship in the 
construction of the U.S. legislature.58 As political theorist Bryan Garsten has 
noted: “Counterintuitive as it sounds, a fundamental purpose of representative 
government, as Constant and Madison saw it, is to oppose popular sovereignty 
in the sense that it is usually understood . . . .”59 Madison departed from the 
Burkean tradition of elitist trusteeship, but he still saw representation as 
primarily an act of independent interpretation rather than simply the relaying of 
an expressed preference.60 It was the intent of some influential founders to 
create a set of buffers between the mass of constituents and policy outcomes by 
treating the vote and representation as distinct entities. What the founders 
created is in exact accord with what we would expect doctrinal conflict to 
produce. The bargain our founders struck was a system of representation that 
sliced up the right to representation and gave us only partial access to delegate 
representation, reserving some of the power of the state for trusteeship. 
To some this warrants calling U.S. democracy undemocratic. Political 
scientists Robert Dahl and Sanford Levinson have both written books decrying 
the U.S. constitutional structure for this very reason.61 More recently and more 
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publically, the radical left publication Jacobin, reported in an article called 
“Tea Party Yankees”: 
  The average member of the House “Suicide Caucus” (half of which is 
southern, compared to 30% of the overall House) won his or her last election 
by a margin of 32 percentage points. Nationwide the average House member 
won by a 31 point margin. For the average Republican winner the margin was 
29%. By comparison, in the last UK election the average parliamentary victor 
won with a total vote of 47%. 
  But the problem runs deeper than the mere mechanics of elections. When 
voters do bother to vote, even on the rare occasions their vote matters, the 
results are rendered opaque and irrelevant—a proliferation of veto points, a 
miasma of dispersed authority—by a constitutional structure meticulously 
designed to suppress any visible connection between the casting of a ballot and 
the enactment of a program.62 
The verdict—that our Constitution is “not very democratic”—was a foregone 
conclusion if one rejects the idea that there is a place for trusteeship in any 
liberal democratic state. 
Robert Dahl, Sanford Levinson, and Jacobin are three very different voices 
articulating surprise and disapproval that representation is so buffered by 
trusteeship in the United States. However, trusteeship cannot and should not be 
rejected out of hand. In fact, the legitimacy of our democracy is reliant on 
trusteeship. I say this because there is so much evidence of these two 
phenomena: on the one hand, disaffected constituents who decry the quality of 
their delegate representation and contribute to the incredibly low popularity of 
our representative institutions in this country;63 and on the other hand, 
evidence of Congress and other public officials acting very much as trustees of 
people who do not and may never vote.64 If we were to predicate the 
legitimacy of our democracy solely on the quality of delegate style 
representation, we would be setting an impossibly high bar for democracy. As 
I will show, it would be far less democratic to abandon trusteeship entirely and 
insist on only legitimizing delegate representation. A great deal of democratic 
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deliberation and inclusion would grind to a halt if we were to think this way 
about representation. 
Thinking about the best interests of the public and considering 
representation to be trusteeship transforms the terms of any discussion about 
who counts in politics in two crucial ways. First, trusteeship does not prioritize 
the stated preferences of constituents over other information regarding their 
welfare that may be available. A representative may weigh a person’s stated 
preferences against an understanding of their interests. This is actually 
necessary even when the representative considers himself to be a delegate. For 
example, people protesting with signs that say “Keep your government hands 
off my Medicare” are sending their representatives an illegible message.65 The 
representative must interpret whether that protestor is more committed to small 
government or more committed to Medicare. Representation is always an act 
of interpretation, as noted by Pitkin and as discussed earlier in this Article.66 
We might say that trustees fail at this some of the time, leaving their non-
voting constituents unrepresented, but then we would also say that they fail to 
represent many voters’ interests as well. 
A second change enforced by considering trusteeship to be an important 
form of representation is that under trusteeship our constituency is not 
considered to be solely a collection of individuals. Trusteeship recognizes 
individual voters to be parts of constituencies defined not simply by electoral 
math but by interests. Ultimately, to a trustee, voters compose one single 
demos, whose collective relationships, histories, and other characteristics and 
outcomes outweigh the importance of any single individual’s interests. An 
individual is almost a fiction in this view because we cannot understand much 
about someone’s needs and interests outside of their social context, which 
inevitably requires understanding their group memberships. Thus, a trustee 
never represents a set of individuals. A trustee always represents a group of 
people. While delegates are also ultimately working on behalf of groups, the 
information they receive necessarily takes the form of aggregated expressions 
of preferences. Using other information treats an entire society rather than 
segmenting the society into distinct demographics. Trustees are trustees of 
social groups as well as individuals. Those social groups will include non-
voters. The trustee’s job is to use that information to protect and further the 
well-being of her constituents, either as individuals, as members of groups, or 
both. 
 
 65. This was a refrain that went viral prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act. Bob 
Cesca, Keep Your Goddamn Government Hands Off My Medicare!, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 
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 66. See supra notes 35–38, 55 and accompanying text. 
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V.  HOW DO WE KNOW WE EXPECT OUR REPRESENTATIVES TO BE TRUSTEES? 
There are myriad arguments to be made about the relative costs and 
benefits of trusteeship versus delegate models of representations. The Burkean 
and Madisonian traditions of trusteeship representation make normative 
arguments in favor of trusteeship for predictable reasons, and scholars such as 
Dahl and Levinson fire back with legitimate concerns about paternalism and 
outright exclusion. At this point, I would like to turn the conversation away 
from normative evaluation and examine how representation actually occurs. 
In any representative system, but particularly in two-party systems, it is 
expected that electoral contestation will result in a winner or set of winners and 
a set of people whose preferred candidate is not elected. As a matter of course, 
it is also true that constituents who vote for a candidate or even a party that 
loses are not considered either disenfranchised or unrepresented just because 
they did not get their way. Robert Dahl’s scathing indictment of the U.S. 
Constitution as undemocratic considers how the Senate unfairly privileges 
residents of sparsely populated states, giving them “more” representation per 
citizen than the residents of populous states receive.67 He and Levinson also 
critique “first-past-the-post” electoral systems for their tendency to produce 
only two political parties, which marginalize or entirely eradicate smaller 
parties and the minority views they represent.68 What Dahl does not say is that 
people who vote for losing candidates should be considered fully 
disenfranchised or unrepresented. Voting for losing candidates is considered an 
inevitable part of democratic politics and representative government. 
In any system of indirect representation we accept that some of the time we 
can and must be represented by someone for whom we did not vote. We also 
know that we will be represented by someone who was elected by people with 
points of view that depart from our own. Any kind of representative 
government depends on citizens’ acceptance of departures from their expressed 
preferences. If any indirect representative system is predicated on the idea that 
people can and will be represented by elected officials for whom they did not 
vote, we cannot dismiss an electoral system such as that of the United States as 
unrepresentative. 
The expectation that we will be represented by people for whom we did 
not vote or by people whose electoral majority expresses views that depart 
from ours invalidates the idea that representatives simply express constituents 
stated preferences. Recognizing trusteeship as legitimate and unavoidable is a 
crucial point in the discussion of representation because, once we accept that 
representation is not always the re-presentation of what we said we wanted, the 
very idea of voting, or of having one’s vote “count,” takes on a new cast. If our 
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representatives are trustees, then we will loosen the expectation that there must 
be a direct correlation between how we vote and what an elected official does. 
Instead of a sharp demarcation between representation and its opposite, we see 
a spectrum of representations that are offered to the population. 
Recall that in the first half of this Article I argued that each of the core 
elements of citizenship exists not in a binary relationship to the absence of that 
right, but rather as a continuum.69 Levinson and Dahl see the continuum of 
representation as marked on one end by direct and participatory democracy and 
on the other end by trusteeship. This slips easily into a treatment of voting as 
an instance of representation and as possibly the only truly democratic instance 
of representation. We move quickly to the point at which we have actually 
conflated voting and representation rather than treating them as distinct ends 
unto themselves. 
In fact, it would not appear that either Levinson or Dahl want to treat 
voting as the only legitimate form of representation. If they were to make this 
argument, any election that seats one party’s candidate automatically 
diminishes the citizenship of the losing party’s supporters. Even systems of 
proportional representation will frequently fail to seat a member of every 
political party in an electoral contest. And any representative formula is a 
recipe for diluting the political will of individual constituents. Having access to 
the franchise is an important element of citizenship, but we cannot jump from 
an argument about disenfranchisement directly to an argument about 
representation. Instead of the direct representation/trusteeship continuum, we 
might recognize voting and representation as having equal and integral 
importance to one’s political citizenship. They are each their own continuum. 
In this case we do not move along a sliding scale of democratic-ness that 
begins with the vote and ends somewhere around trusteeship. Instead, 
instances of representation can happen in the absence of enfranchisement just 
as we expect that representation can still occur when the exercise of one’s 
franchise rights does not result in one’s chosen candidate or party being 
elected. This is a good thing for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact 
that so few people vote in the United States, let alone vote in non-presidential 
elections. 
If we treat representation and enfranchisement as having equal significance 
to any person’s political citizenship, the most important ongoing work a 
member of the population can do is the work of making her identity and all of 
her life circumstances visible in the public sphere. This is consistent with T.H. 
Marshall’s description of civil rights of speech as integral to political rights of 
representation and franchise.70 
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VI.  TRUSTEESHIP AND DISENFRANCHISED GROUPS 
Our implicit acceptance of trusteeship in any representative system opens 
the way to ask questions about whether semi-citizens who are not enfranchised 
are also not represented. Levinson mentions a wide array of groups who are 
disenfranchised in contemporary American politics. He focuses particular 
attention on ex-felons and non-citizens.71 To this list we might also add 
children, who generally compose the largest disenfranchised group in any 
democratic society.72 Relying for the moment on these notable instances of 
antidemocratic representation, we can interrogate whether the absence of the 
political right to vote automatically leads to a breakdown of representation. 
Felons (and sometimes ex-felons), non-citizens, and children are all classes of 
persons that are disenfranchised. To what extent do we also believe that each 
of these groups is also unrepresented? 
A. Children’s Semi-Citizenship and Representation 
Political theorists considering the idea of childhood have advocated for 
considering the state to be the fiduciary of children’s basic interests while 
parents are treated as fiduciaries of children’s best interests.73 Fiduciaries in 
this context “act[] on behalf of someone else, usually because of that person’s 
temporary or permanent incapacity. Fiduciaries do not pursue their own 
interests; indeed, to do so would generally be seen as an abuse of the fiduciary 
role.”74 Fiduciaries embody the trusteeship model of representation. In the 
basic interests/best interests formulation, the state is responsible for providing 
children with a basic social safety net. To the extent that this requires 
representation, various government agencies at the federal and state levels are 
responsible for recognizing children as persons, bringing children’s interests 
into the public sphere, and fulfilling the charge of ensuring their security and 
physical well-being. This might mean ensuring a free and high-quality public 
education, or it might require funding welfare programs that feed and shelter 
poor families with children. Parents, in turn, are fiduciaries of children’s 
interests in things like their religious upbringing, the transmission of personal 
values, their connection to a community, and the development of their political 
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views. The fiduciary model departs from the coverture model insofar as it 
stipulates that the state is responsible for certain children’s interests regardless 
of whether parents exercise their franchise on behalf of their children. It would 
be beyond the scope of this discussion to thoroughly evaluate all the ways in 
which the state does or does not fulfill its responsibilities to children. The 
essential observation to make is that states regularly prove themselves capable 
of discharging their duties to children as well as they discharge their duties to 
most full citizens. Nor is it clear that enfranchising even children who are 
developmentally quite similar to adults would result in a markedly different or 
improved outcome. While it is important to recognize that children are not full 
citizens, it would be impossible to fully enfranchise all children. Conflating 
enfranchisement and representation obscures the ways in which trusteeship 
functions to represent children. 
B. Non-Citizen Semi-Citizenship and Representation 
Levinson raises questions about the disenfranchisement of non-citizens.75 
Non-citizen disenfranchisement takes several forms. Undocumented persons, 
various types of temporary residents including guest-workers and students, 
refugees, and permanent residents all have different forms of semi-citizenship 
and different citizenship trajectories. What they all have in common is that 
they are counted by the census, and hence for the purposes of apportionment, 
they are expected to obey laws including those that tax them, and they have 
some civil and social rights associated with citizenship.76 Those civil and 
social rights are quite robust in the case of permanent residents and quite 
anemic in the case of undocumented persons and temporary workers.77 They 
also share a common political fate: none may vote in federal elections and 
almost nowhere in the United States can any of them vote in any election.78 
Is the disenfranchisement of non-U.S. citizens tantamount to the absence 
of any opportunities for the representation of non-citizens in U.S. politics? 
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There is evidence that non-citizen interests in fact do receive representation, 
and that in their case trusteeship representation has and might again offer the 
opportunity for a transition from trusteeship to both delegate style 
representation and the forms of enfranchisement offered to full citizens. 
Somebody is doing some work to represent the interests of undocumented 
immigrants, one of the most fully and permanently disenfranchised groups to 
whom “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?” refers. Otherwise they would not be 
getting driver’s licenses in some states,79 being regularized by infrequent but 
important amnesties,80 and receiving various other benefits.81 This is not to say 
that their semi-citizenship constitutes a fully just arrangement. It is simply an 
observation that representation occurs in the absence of the franchise. 
The starkest evidence of this fact is the 1986 amnesty, which ultimately 
transformed approximately three million undocumented and temporary 
workers into permanent residents eligible to naturalize.82 If representation of 
either the trusteeship or delegate can be said to accomplish anything, it ought 
to accomplish large-scale change that expands the opportunities for political 
participation of groups seeking those rights. 
Their interests are not only being protected because businesses stand to 
profit or because they have family members in this country, both of which 
would constitute an indirect form of trusteeship. Governors, senators, and even 
the President have also spoken on behalf of the interests of the 
undocumented.83 They also are speaking on behalf of themselves in Congress, 
as we saw when Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Jose Antonio Vargas testified 
 
 79. Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, In-State Tuition, Driver’s Licenses, And Other Immigrant-Friendly 
Laws That Took Effect This Week, THINKPROGRESS, (Jan. 3, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://thinkpro 
gress.org/immigration/2014/01/03/3114881/immigration-laws-january-1-2014/. 
 80. The Seven Amnesties Passed by Congress, NUMBERSUSA, https://www.numbersusa. 
com/content/learn/illegal-immigration/seven-amnesties-passed-congress.html (last updated June 
7, 2011). 
 81. Spiro, supra note 76. 
 82. Betsy Cooper & Kevin O’Neil, Lessons From the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 3 (Aug. 2005), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/re 
search/lessons-immigration-reform-and-control-act-1986. 
 83. See Jenna Portnoy, Chris Christie Trumpets Signing of Dream Act in Union City, STAR-
LEDGER (Jan 07, 2014, 9:10 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/01/chris_christie_ 
trumpets_signing_of_dream_act_in_union_city.html; Andy Bromage, Sanders and Welch Go to 
Bat for Migrant Farmworker Facing Deportation; Leahy Still Noncommittal, SEVEN DAYS: VT’S 
INDEPENDENT VOICE (Jun. 18, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.sevendaysvt.com/OffMessage/ar 
chives/2013/06/18/sanders-and-welch-go-to-bat-for-migrant-farmworker-facing-deportation-
leahy-still-noncommittal; President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration 
Reform (Oct. 24, 2013), available at OFF. PRESS SEC’Y, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2013/10/24/remarks-president-immigration-reform. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1066 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1047 
about Comprehensive Immigration Reform.84 One could hardly say that 
disenfranchisement has denied non-citizens access to the public sphere or the 
opportunity to influence public policy. If we take the premise of the first half 
of this Article seriously, we presume that semi-citizenship is inevitable. Some 
people will be disenfranchised in any liberal democratic state. The prevalence 
of birthright citizenship laws makes it likely that non-citizens will also be 
semi-citizens, disenfranchised either temporarily or in some cases 
permanently. But this need not seem to have resulted in the permanent absence 
of immigrant interests from any part of the public sphere. 
C. Felon Semi-Citizenship and Representation 
Levinson’s other example of a sizeable group that is counted by the state 
but not included in the demos is felons.85 The semi-citizenship of felons differs 
from that of children and most non-citizens. While children are persons on 
their way to enfranchisement, and many non-citizens start out and remain 
disenfranchised, felons were at one time enfranchised but they lose that right 
upon their incarceration. Sometimes they regain that right and sometimes they 
do not.86 Any adult offender incarcerated for a felony possessed a vote prior to 
their first conviction. This difference creates a gulf between the trusteeship 
models of representation on behalf of children, immigrants, and felons. Losing 
one’s vote is a categorically different circumstance than someone who is on 
track to become enfranchised but has not yet completed the track. In the 
felon’s case, it leads to ask how someone previously considered competent to 
vote and represent herself can be deemed incompetent to do so. 
This question begs us to examine the basis for disenfranchisement. All 
three groups under consideration are treated by the demos as either temporarily 
or permanently “incapacit[ated],” to reintroduce Ian Shapiro’s justification for 
the use of a fiduciary model of representation.87 Children’s developmental 
immaturity is well documented,88 even if some children demonstrably 
outperform their peers or even some adults in matters of political judgment. It 
is not difficult to see why children are considered unfit to represent themselves. 
Non-citizens are also treated as having untested loyalties, and it is a nearly 
universal rule that foreign-born persons will have to endure a probationary 
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period before they are enfranchised.89 The probationary period is thought to 
allow the development of ties and the acquisition of knowledge and norms 
required for informed political participation.90 However, the least well-
represented group of disenfranchised persons, felons and ex-felons, is 
different. Children and non-citizens are developing political capabilities. We 
do our best to ascertain when that threshold of capabilities has been reached, 
and we judge it incrementally.91 A felony conviction is a breach of the social 
contract. Crimes of moral turpitude therefore make a judgment about character 
rather than capability, the trait to which Shapiro referred. 
A character judgment departs from a capability judgment and necessarily 
represents the most subjective and potentially fraught elements of the 
democratic ethos. Recall Robert Dahl’s reluctance to introduce contingency to 
questions of enfranchisement except in cases involving children, transients, 
and the mentally unfit.92 Dahl resists a higher degree of contingency because 
character judgments are highly vulnerable to the prejudices held by the demos. 
Character judgments are often proxies for judgments that address neither 
capability nor character.93 
Returning to the question at hand: the conclusion that a felony conviction 
voids someone’s capacity to make any political judgments is difficult to reach 
and seems unrelated to the history of felon disenfranchisement. The most 
detailed studies of the history of felon disenfranchisement in the United States 
document that the practice gained initial momentum among states seeking to 
counteract the enfranchisement of blacks following the passage of the 
Thirteenth Amendment.94 More recently, Michelle Alexander has illustrated 
how post-Jim Crow drug criminalization and sentencing practices were part 
and parcel of explicit attempts on the part of the Republican Party to politically 
isolate and disempower black Americans.95 Felon disenfranchisement is 
categorically different from the disenfranchisement of children and non-
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 91. COHEN, supra note 1, at 206. 
 92. See DAHL, supra note 14, at 129. 
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citizens. It has a long history of connection with racial discrimination in the 
United States. 
Mirroring the difference in the trajectory and basis of felon 
disenfranchisement, the quality of political representation available to them is 
markedly lower than that available to children and many non-citizens. By and 
large, trusteeship fails as a model for the representation of felons. Mounting 
evidence exists demonstrating that the disenfranchisement of felons has a 
measurable and important effect on the outcome of elections at every level of 
government.96 Furthermore, the experience of incarceration in the United 
States has proven to be intractably inhumane. Recent protests and hunger 
strikes have revealed the truly sordid conditions in which people incarcerated 
in overcrowded prison systems such as California and Texas live.97 These 
efforts at launching a social movement have by and large been declared a 
failure.98 Similarly, Texas’s Maricopa County has gained national notoriety for 
housing prisoners in “Tent City,” a site infamous for cruelly high temperatures 
and otherwise inhumane conditions.99 While incarcerated, prisoners work for a 
fraction of what their legal wages would be were they not incarcerated.100 
The fact that felon disenfranchisement is not predicated on a 
developmental discrepancy between felons and full citizens and the fact that 
felon disenfranchisement has been directly linked to racially discriminatory 
practices may explain why trusteeship on behalf of felons fails in comparison 
to the trusteeship exercised on behalf of children. In this case, 
disenfranchisement is neither protective nor probationary. Felon 
disenfranchisement is intended not just to disenfranchise but also to reduce the 
likelihood that the interests of black Americans will be represented. Based on 
the findings of Uggen and Manza, it would appear that this effort has had at 
least some success. Not only has a large and disproportionate subset of black 
Americans been disenfranchised, but this disenfranchisement has altered 
multiple electoral outcomes and affected the degree to which the interests of 
black Americans, particularly those targeted by the criminal justice system, are 
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cared for in any capacity.101 During the period of time since the Voting Rights 
Act came into effect, the number of black men that are incarcerated and the 
length of time served has skyrocketed.102 It seems implausible to say that the 
moral character of any social group has or could have plunged so rapidly 
during this period. More likely, as Alexander persuasively demonstrates, it is 
the case that the omnipresent resistance to adequately representing black 
Americans has found a highly effective vehicle in felon disenfranchisement. 
CONCLUSION: INEVITABILITY 
Like all rights of citizenship, the political rights associated with 
participatory democracy can be structured in more than one way and can be 
parceled out to greater and lesser degrees. This creates semi-citizenships for 
members of the population who have some but not all rights associated with 
full citizenship. Semi-citizenship is inevitable because liberal democratic states 
inevitably engender doctrinal conflict. That competition results in bargains 
being struck in which citizenship rights are portioned out into different bundles 
for different groups and individuals. Many of us hold forms of semi-citizenship 
at one or another points in our lives. 
Our political rights of franchise and representation exemplify this 
phenomenon. Regardless of whether we think it just or unjust, liberal 
democratic states disenfranchise some members in an attempt to reconcile 
conflicting doctrines. This does not always mean that the disenfranchised are 
unrepresented. Precisely because there is often as much doctrinal support for 
including any given semi-citizen in the purview of the state as there is support 
for excluding them, these disenfranchised groups are frequently represented in 
the public sphere, sometimes in quite robust fashion. This can occur when 
representatives serve as fiduciaries or trustees; Ian Shapiro’s definition of the 
fiduciary was someone to whom we entrust the interests of a person who is 
temporarily or permanently incapacitated. Semi-citizens are just such persons 
and can in some cases be represented via trusteeship. In this sense, they are not 
entirely different than people who vote for losing candidates and must rely on 
someone for whom they did not vote for representation. 
This Article does not argue in favor of abandoning the cause of 
enfranchising semi-citizens who are capable of exercising franchise rights. 
Quite the contrary: the most successful instances of trusteeship described in 
this Article are those that move toward or end in the enfranchisement of 
different semi-citizens. The argument of this Article is simply that trusteeship 
 
 101. Uggen & Manza, supra note 96, at 789. 
 102. The prison population of the United States rose every single year between 1978 and 
2009. U.S. Prison Population Declined for Third Consecutive Year During 2012, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF J. (July 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/press/p12acpr.cfm. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1070 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1047 
is an accepted and absolutely unavoidable means for ensuring that people who 
are not full citizens still count in democratic politics—even when the demos is 
less convinced of their equality than are either the state or liberal philosophy. 
Exclusion, misrecognition, and disenfranchisement are inevitable. The work of 
democracy is not limited to voting and delegating. It also requires that we 
constantly scrutinize and contest the reasons and bases on which we exclude, 
misrecognize, and disenfranchise. In so doing, the interests of the 
disenfranchised will receive public attention. In the cases presented in this 
Article, scrutiny yielded a marked distinction: groups for whom 
disenfranchisement is a starting point in their political trajectories and for 
whom disenfranchisement is based on a change in their capabilities are 
distinguished from groups with ostensible moral failings mired in a history of 
discrimination. In the latter case, we find a set of much more objectionable 
practices than we do in either of the two former cases. Our work as citizens 
and semi-citizens is then to figure out how to represent both our individual 
selves and the interests of the groups, selves, and identities whose rights are 
unjustifiably compromised. 
 
